The Bioenergy Association of Finland represents the interests of bioenergy and biochar sectors in Finland. We welcome the release of the draft delegated act and methodologies for DACCS, BioCCS, and BCR methodologies. Getting these methodologies right is essential for establishing a robust, standardised approach to large-scale industrial carbon removals and achieving climate targets. We appreciate the opportunity to provide feedback on the draft delegated act and methodologies.
Carbon removal projects provide significant and critical climate benefits when realized, and the EU cannot afford to create a framework that fails in its target to promote permanent carbon removals. Projects related to the permanent storage of biogenic CO2 (BioCCS and biochar) play a critical role in achieving the EU’s climate targets. They are currently the most cost-effective project types in the EU for permanent carbon removals, with significant scaling potential. By 2040, the EU should achieve permanent carbon removals of at least around 80 Mt per year. Achieving this target cost-effectively is impossible without projects based on the permanent storage of biogenic CO2.
Policy coherence and alignment with the existing legislation are crucial to ensure a consistent climate policy. The methodologies under development must ensure long-term predictability for operations, minimize additional administrative burdens from certification, and emphasize cost-effectiveness without compromising agreed sustainability criteria. Without this coherence, there is a risk of poor integration with other pillars of climate policy, rendering the framework ineffective. At this stage, certain clarifications and focused amendments are required to ensure the framework is both fair and functional, and that it effectively supports the rapid scale-up of permanent carbon removals.
Detailed comments
Alignment with the Renewable Energy Directive (RED III) (Section 4.2(b) (ii) and (iii) of the Annex)
We strongly support the Commission’s efforts to align the CRCF regulation with the Renewable Energy Directive (RED III), which provides a coherent and well-established framework for the sustainable use of biomass. Such alignment is essential to ensure legal certainty, prevent regulatory duplication, and support long-term investment planning across the EU.
However, the direct application of the cascading principle in this context should not be applied. Article 3(3) of RED III refers specifically to support schemes for energy, and BECCS’s role in the cascading hierarchy should be carefully assessed before integrating this principle into the proposed methodology. It is important that the methodology recognises that co-producing carbon removals and energy delivers a significantly different economic and environmental added value compared to producing energy alone. Any translation of the cascading hierarchy to the certification of carbon removals, or to potential Member State derogations on feedstock eligibility, should therefore rely on robust comparative lifecycle assessment (LCA).
It is worth mentioning with this respect the current European General Court decision T‑579/22 on where the European Commission on its submission emphasised that cascading is very complex concept and scientific evidence is still missing. Commission continued by justifying that RED3 directive already includes requirements for waste hierarchy and circular economy.
At this stage, since the implementation of these provisions by Member States remains unclear (including the treatment of BECCS within the hierarchy), further clarification and closer alignment with RED is needed. RED places additional requirements on bioenergy activities only when public funds are granted for energy production. Given that all permanent CDR activities will likely require public subsidies in the near term, it should be clarified that these extra requirements apply to BECCS activities only if subsidies are provided for the energy production component and not for carbon removals.
To be fully consistent with RED, if and when the cascading principle is applied, it should only be triggered when public subsidies are granted for energy production, not when subsidies are granted for the carbon capture element of an installation. This consistency should be reflected in Section 4.2(b) (ii) and (iii) of the Annex of the draft Delegated Act.
Biochar as primary product (Section 4.3.2. of the Annex)
We strongly oppose the proposed limitation of biomass feedstocks for biochar carbon removal projects where biochar is the primary product, accounting for more than 50 % of the energy output of the co-products.
The properties of biochar are influenced by both the raw materials used and the production process. Limiting the permitted raw materials solely to the ”wastes and residues” category would unjustifiably exclude certain biochar projects from carbon removal certification, even though these projects are able to provide carbon removals and, in many cases, fulfil additional functions, such as immobilize pollutants in environmental remediation. For all biochar carbon removal projects, sustainability criteria should also align with those of the RED. Introducing additional, technology-specific restrictions has no scientific or policy justification, and risks undermining the scalability of biochar as a carbon removal pathway. Technology-specific restrictions also do not align with the Commission’s objective of technological neutrality as one of the main principles of energy and climate policy. This restriction potentially poses a major challenge for availability of biomass for biochar projects, putting biochar production at risk of being marginalised.
Notably, leading voluntary carbon market (VCM) methodologies such as Puro.earth’s do not impose such restrictive feedstock criteria. Under Puro methodology (Edition 2025), forest biomass—including both primary feedstock (harvested from forest land) and secondary feedstock (from processing)—are allowed, provided they do not compete with material suitable for long-lived wood products (e.g. sawtimber or veneer). This is a balanced approach that ensures sufficient feedstock availability. There are clear reasons for this as short-lived wood products do not provide permanent carbon storage, whereas pyrolysing them into biochar creates stable, permanent carbon removal. Also, since biochar is used by industrial customers, it must meet uniform quality standards which cannot be reliably achieved using only waste wood or residue biomass.
The permanence requirements set out in Section 2.2.7.1 of the Annex already ensure that certain chars such as charcoal are not eligible for certification. Therefore, the additional restriction linked to energy outputs is unnecessary and should be removed. We urge the Commission to ensure that biochar projects remain eligible under the CRCF, provided they meet the same sustainability requirements as other methods, without arbitrary feedstock exclusions.
Monitoring requirements for BCR activities (1.2.2.2 of the Annex)
Scientific consensus1 indicates that the inert fraction of biochar carries a negligible risk of re-emission, independent of biochar migration. While long-term field trials and studies on biochar migration remain valuable scientific pursuits, for certification purposes permanence is more effectively ensured through conservative material characterization and thorough documentation of end use, rather than through post-application MRV at the level of individual BCR activities.
The monitoring obligation for biochar for all use cases should end at the stage where the CO2 is in a stable form. Based on the feedstock of the biochar and laboratory results, this can be reliably determined using the methods presented in the methodology. The additional monitoring requirements significantly increase MRV costs and are nearly impossible to implement in practice. Given the minimal reversal risk, they add no real value.
The CRCF methodology should recognise that once the biochar is mixed into a mineral matrix, or in a product, it should not be liable to monitoring as the carbon is in a stable form and therefore consistent with the principles of the CCS directive on monitoring and liability.
Disclosure requirements on biomass feedstock (Section 4.3 of the Annex)
The biomass sustainability criteria and reporting obligations should follow the framework of RED as closely as possible, drawing on the classifications used in voluntary certification schemes or in existing national and sectoral systems. Article 30(3) of the Renewable Energy Directive already lays down detailed reporting requirements, including on feedstock types and geographical origin.
Feedstock reporting requirements should be aligned with existing industry practices and standards, using commonly accepted terminology.
Avoidance of unsustainable demand for biomass raw material (Section 4.3 of the Annex)
Requirement for new-build facilities
We recognise the importance of safeguarding against unsustainable biomass demand and the underlying objective of avoiding market distortions and ensuring cascading use. However, we do not support the current requirement that new-build facilities must demonstrate they would be ‘economically viable without carbon capture’ in order to qualify under the certification framework.
This provision risks introducing a misleading and impractical economic test. Many renewable and low-carbon projects—across electricity, heat, fuels, and industry—are not currently viable without policy support. Assessing their hypothetical standalone profitability adds little value and could hinder projects that are needed to achieving climate objectives.
To strengthen environmental integrity, a requirement to the accounting of all upstream supply-chain emissions for newly constructed facilities, not only those associated with the energy consumed by the CCS installation, should be established. Such an approach would conservatively capture the full range of activities initiated by the development of a new BECCS project.
Nameplate biomass consumption
The current provisions on “nameplate biomass consumption capacity” risk penalising fuel-switching projects. Facilities transitioning from co-firing fossil fuels and biomass to operating entirely on sustainable biomass with CCS will, by definition, increase their biomass consumption. This should be recognised as a positive decarbonisation pathway, not restricted by rigid nameplate limits. The section 4.3.1 of the Annex should be amended to reflect overall power production capacity rather than biomass consumption capacity, enabling fuel switching to 100% biomass with CCS while still safeguarding against unsustainable demand through EU RED and EUDR rules.
Treatment of mothballed installation
Encouraging the conversion of existing infrastructure to BECCS is a sustainable and resource-efficient pathway. Making use of existing installations reduces the need for new construction and the associated environmental impacts, including land use and embedded carbon, compared to newly built facilities. For this reason, such projects should not be subject to additional requirements relative to already operating biomass facilities. Mothballed installations should not be considered as “newly constructed facilities”. This is irrespective of whether the facilities have changed economic control or not.
Change of economic control
It is unclear why specific emphasis is placed on changes in economic control. Mergers and acquisitions are a well-established mechanism for unlocking investment into decarbonisation projects, enabling scale, expertise, and capital to be brought together. The current language would unnecessarily limit opportunities for partnerships between existing facilities and technology providers. In practice, it is common to establish separate legal entities as joint venture vehicles, which allow partners to pool resources and manage liabilities while accelerating project delivery.
We urge the Commission to remove the “change of control” condition, as it would undermine the EU’s attractiveness and competitiveness for carbon removal investments.
Overcompensation clause (Section 2.1.2 of the Annex)
The inclusion of a clause requiring disclosure of public and private funding “to avoid overcompensation” is problematic, as there is no definition of what constitutes overcompensation or how it would be assessed. This lack of clarity risks creating uncertainty for project developers and investors.
The notion of overcompensation is not present in the CRCF Regulation nor in the Delegated Regulation’s main body, and its sudden appearance in the Annex raises legal and interpretive uncertainties. Furthermore, since additionality is already ensured via the standardised baseline and since projects can already combine public and private funding (as acknowledged by the Regulation), this clause appears redundant.
We urge deleting the clause altogether or at a minimum clarifying that it is purely informational and not used to trigger eligibility or accounting restrictions.